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Abstract
We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a
hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players’ preferences in the game
we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in
the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the
“most” stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social
Democratic Party.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we address the question which parties in the 16th German Bundestag “should”
form a government. According to the election results from September 18, 2005, there are five
fractions obtaining seats in the parliament. From the distribution of seats, one can easily
identify those coalitions of parties that are winning in the sense that they have a majority and,
therefore, may agree to form the government. However, as past negotiations within different
constellations have shown, each party clearly has preferences over the possible governments
∗Financial support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (D. Dimitrov) is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
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it may be a member of. On the one hand this has of course to do with political views, but
on the other hand, each party also looks at its “strength” in a government. Strength can,
for example, be quantified by the number of ministries that this party would obtain. In view
of this, any government can be tested on its stability in the sense that there is no other
government that is preferred to the tested one by any of its members.
What would be an appropriate analytical tool to answer the question who should be
government and who should be opposition? Using the language of cooperative game theory,
and taking the distribution of seats in the parliament into account, we have a well defined
simple game (cf. Shapley (1962)) with the parliamentary fractions in the Bundestag as
players. The game itself only reflects the possibilities to form majorities. What we need to
know is how ministries will be distributed among parties in a government. Hence, we need a
tool to measure the “power” of a party. Here we use the Shapley value (Shapley (1953))1 as
a solution concept on simple games that reflects parties strengths, taking their opportunities
into account to be part of majorities. By using the Shapley value, we assume parties to be
purely office seeking and fade out political affinities.
Assuming that each party’s incentive to take part in a government depends on how
much power it is assigned by the Shapley value, we obtain preferences over coalitions. These
preferences together form a hedonic coalition formation game (cf. Banerjee et. al. (2001) and
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)). A solution of this (and each) hedonic game is a partition
of the set of parties into coalitions, which in particular assigns to each party its role in the
government or in the opposition. Moreover, we have a suitable environment in which the
question of stability can be approached. As it can be easily seen, it is not possible a coalition
structure to be stable (to be defined later) if it does not contain a winning coalition. Hence,
the answer to the question which partitions are stable is at the same time an answer to the
question which government should form with respect to stability concerns.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some basic notions from
the theory of simple games and hedonic games, and discuss different stability concepts for
hedonic games (see also Sung and Dimitrov (2005)). In Section 3 we first define the simple
game that corresponds to the distribution of seats in the 16th German Bundestag and then
induce a hedonic game by using the Shapley value of all subgames of the simple game. As it
turns out, the strongest form of stability that can be achieved in this case is semistrict core
stability. Moreover, all partitions in the semistrict core share a common property: in each
of them the government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic
Party. Thus, the analysis along the above ideas concurs with the actual result from the
current government finding process. We conclude in Section 4 by relating our results to the
study of coalition formation in simple games provided by Shenoy (1979) and Kirchsteiger
and Puppe (1997).
1In the context of simple games also known as the Shapley-Shubik Index.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Simple Games
A simple game with transferable utility (or simple TU-game) is a pair (N, v), where N =
{1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players and v : 2N → {0, 1} satisfying v(∅) = 0 is called a
characteristic function. Subsets S ⊆ N will be called coalitions. In the context of parlia-
mentary fractions forming coalitions, we may distinguish coalitions that are “strong enough”
to form a majority and those who are not. Consequently, we interpret a value v(S) = 1
as coalition S having a majority in the parliament (or being able to win an election).
Analogously, v(S ′) = 0 means that S ′ cannot win in a (majority) decision. For a simple
game (N, v), we denote by W(N,v) = {S ⊆ N | v(S) = 1} the set of winning coalitions and
by MW(N,v) = {S ⊆ N | v(S) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S} the set of minimal winning
coalitions, i.e., those winning coalitions that cannot be further reduced without losing the
majority.
A simple game (N, v) is monotonic if v(S) = 1 implies v(T ) = 1 for all T ⊇ S, and
proper if v(S) = 1 implies v(N \ S) = 0. For each S ⊆ N the subgame (S, v|S) is obtained
from (N, v) by restricting attention to S, i.e., v|S(T ) = v(T ) for all T ⊆ S. The set of all
simple TU-games on the player set N will be denoted by GN .
Finally, a solution (of a simple game) is a mapping f : GN → RN that satisfies∑i∈N fi(v) ≤
v(N). In the context of simple games, f shall readily be interpreted as an “index of power”
as, in case v is not the zero game, a total value of 1 is distributed among the players. The
most prominent solution concept is undoubtedly the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). The
Shapley value of player i in a game (N, v) is given by the formula
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N
(|N | − |S|)! (|S| − 1)!
|N |! (v(S)− v(S \ {i})) (i ∈ N).
2.2 Hedonic Games
Again, consider a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and for each player i ∈ N , we denote
by Ni = {X ⊆ N | i ∈ X} the collection of all coalitions containing i. A partition Π of
N into coalitions is called a coalition structure, i.e., the coalitions in Π are pairwise disjoint
and
⋃
X∈ΠX = N . For each coalition structure Π and each player i ∈ N , by Π(i) we denote
the coalition in Π containing i, i.e., Π(i) ∈ Π and i ∈ Π(i).
We assume that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a preference ºi over Ni, i.e., a binary
relation over Ni which is complete and transitive. By Âi and ∼i we denote the strict and
the equivalence relation corresponding to ºi. We write º= (º1, . . . ,ºn) for the profile of
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preferences ºi (i ∈ N). Player i’s preference over coalitions naturally induces a preference
over coalition structures in the following way: Coalition structure Π is weakly preferred to
Π′ if and only if Π(i) º Π′(i) holds. In this sense i’s preference over coalition structures is
purely hedonic, as he only cares about the coalition he is a member of.
A hedonic game (N,º) is a pair of a finite set N of players and a preference profile º
as above. In contrast to TU games, a hedonic game does not provide incentives for players
to form coalitions by assigning a worth to each coalition, but it reflects player’s preferences
to join certain coalitions. Hence, a solution for a hedonic game shall not distribute some
value among the players but should analyze which coalitions should form on the basis of
players’ preferences. In effect it asks for which coalition structure evolves. To this end,
stability notions (with respect to coalition structures) enter the scene. We next discuss three
different versions.
Let (N,º) be a hedonic game. For any coalition X ⊆ N and for any coalition structure
Π of N , let XΠ(X) := {X ∩ P | P ∈ Π}. We say that Π is strictly core stable if there does
not exist a nonempty coalition X such that X ºi Π(i) holds for all i ∈ X and X Âj Π(j) is
true for some player j ∈ X. Π is semistrictly core stable if there does not exist a nonempty
coalition X such that X ºi Π(i) for all i ∈ X and for each X ′ ∈ XΠ(X) there is j ∈ X ′
with X Âj Π(j). Π is core stable if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X such that
X Âi Π(i) holds for each i ∈ X.
Put in other words, a coalition structure Π is strictly core stable if there is no coalitional
deviation in which every player is weakly better off and at least one player is strictly better
off in comparison to the corresponding coalitions in Π. In the definition of semistrict core
stability a more precise structure of the set of players who are strictly better off in a deviation
is added; this addition is made by requiring that at least one player from each original
coalition (according to Π) strictly prefers to be in the corresponding deviating coalition.2
Clearly, the weakest notion of a coalitional deviation is incorporated in the definition of core
stability - everyone in the deviating coalition should be strictly better off.
To conclude, we mention the simple observation that strict core stability implies semistrict
core stability that, in turn, implies core stability.
3 Coalition Formation via the Shapley Value
In this section we address the question which parties in the 16th German Bundestag should
form the government and who should form the opposition, if arguments for or against are
based on stability concepts as introduced in the previous section. Observe that the distribu-
2The idea of semistrict core stability can already be found in the work of Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997).
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tion of seats in the parliament naturally defines a simple game that reflects all opportunities
to form majorities. In the current parliament there are five fractions present (listed accord-
ing to the number of seats): (1) CDU/CSU (Union Parties) with s1 = 226 seats, (2) SPD
(Social Democratic Party) with s2 = 222 seats, (3) FDP (Liberal Democratic Party) with
s3 = 61 seats, (4) PDS.Die Linke (Left Party) with s4 = 54 seats, and (5) B’90/Die Gru¨nen
(Green Party) with s5 = 51 seats. To form a majority, a coalition thus requires a total of
614/2+ 1 = 308 seats. Consequently, we may define a simple game (N, vBundestag) = (N, v)
with N = {1, . . . , 5} and v be such that for all S ⊆ N we have
v(S) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈S
si ≥ 308.
The set of minimal winning coalitions is given by3
MW(N,v) = {12, 134, 135, 145, 234, 235, 245} .
Notice also that (N, v) is monotonic and proper.
(N, v) alone only reflects which coalitions may form a government. Yet, it does not
include any information about how, e.g., ministries are to be distributed. The Shapley value
measures the “strength” of a party within a coalition in the following way. Suppose the
grand coalition (i.e., N) agrees to form a government. The Shapley value of (N, v), which is
given by
Sh(N, v) =
1
30
(9, 9, 4, 4, 4),
suggests, for example, that a “big” party (1 or 2) should get roughly twice as many ministries
as a small one (3, 4, or 5).
Given the Bundestag game (N, v), we define a hedonic game
(
N,ºBundestag
)
= (N,º)
by inducing players’ preferences over coalitions in the following way. For each i ∈ N and for
all S, T ∈ Ni, we define ºi by
S ºi T ⇔ Shi
(
S, v|S
) ≥ Shi (T, v|T ) . (1)
According to (1), player i’s preferences over any two coalitions S and T he is a member of are
induced by i’s Shapley value in the simple game restricted to S and T , respectively. Notice
that paying attention to the corresponding coalitions is compatible with the very definition
of a hedonic game - each player in such a game evaluates any two coalition structures based
only on his preferences over the coalitions in the two partitions he belongs to (cf. Aumann
and Dre´ze (1974) and Shenoy (1979)).
We present below players’ payoffs according to the Shapley value of the corresponding
subgames (the first column) and players’ preferences induced in the way indicated in (1).
3We simplify notation for coalitions by using, e.g., “134” instead of {1, 3, 4}.
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For example, player 1’s payoff in the coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 2, 5} is Sh1
({1, 2} , v|{1,2}) =
Sh1
({1, 2, 5} , v|{1,2,5}) = 12 , and his payoff in the coalition {1, 3, 5} is Sh1 ({1, 3, 5} , v|{1,3,5}) =
1
3
. Hence, as displayed in Table 1, each player is indifferent between any two coalitions on
the same row, and each player strictly prefers a coalition on a higher row over a coalition on
a lower row.
Shi º1 º2
1
2
12, 123, 124, 125, 1345 12, 123, 124, 125, 2345
1
3
134, 135, 145, 1234, 1235, 1245 234, 235, 245, 1234, 1235, 1245
9
30
12345 12345
0 1, ... 2, ...
Shi º3 º4 º5
1
3
134, 135, 234, 235 134, 145, 234, 245 135, 145, 235, 245
1
6
1234, 1235, 1345, 2345 1234, 1245, 1345, 2345 1235, 1245, 1345, 2345
4
30
12345 12345 12345
0 3, ... 4, ... 5, ...
Table 1: Preferences over coalitions
We now turn to the question whether there exist stable coalition structures for the 16th
German Bundestag. As Proposition 1 shows, the strongest form of stability is not achievable.
Proposition 1 Let (N,º) be the hedonic game defined in (1). Then there is no strictly core
stable coalition structure for (N,º).
It will be of benefit to present the proof of Proposition 1 after the proof of Proposition 2.
Before we proceed, notice first that due to properness of (N, v), any coalition structure
can at most carry one winning coalition, which we refer to as government (G). Analogously,
the set of remaining players is called opposition (O). The next lemma shows that splitting
the opposition does not alter semistrict core stability.
Lemma 1 Let Π = {G,O} be a coalition structure with two elements and for which v(G) = 1
holds. If Π is semistrictly core stable, then so is any coalition structure of the form Π′ =
{G,O1, . . . , Ok}, where {O1, . . . , Ok} is a partition of O.
Proof. Suppose Π′ = {G,O1, . . . , Ok} is not semistrictly core stable. Then there is a
coalition X ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ X we have X ºi Π′(i) and for each X ′ ∈ XΠ′(X)
there is j′ ∈ X ′ with X Âj′ Π(j′). As X has to be a winning coalition, we know by
properness that X ∩G 6= ∅ and so there exist iG ∈ G ∩X, iO ∈
⋃k
r=1Or ∩X = O ∩X with
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X ÂiG Π′(iG) = Π(iG) = G and X ÂiO Π′(iO) ∼iO Π(iO) = O. Hence, Π is not semistrictly
core stable, which contradicts our assumption.
After obtaining a negative result for the strict core, we check, whether there are semistrictly
core stable coalition structures.
Proposition 2 For the game (N,º) defined in (1) the coalition structure Π = {12, 345} is
semistrictly core stable. Moreover, there are no semistrictly core stable coalition structures
Π′ = {G,O1, . . . , Ok} with v(G) = 1 and G 6= {1, 2}.
Proof. To see that the coalition structure {12, 345} is semistrictly core stable, notice
that the coalition {1, 2} is among player 1’s and player 2’s best coalitions. Hence, for any
X ⊆ N with X ∩ {1, 2} 6= ∅ we have Π(i) ºi X for all i ∈ X ∩ {1, 2}. Recalling that any
coalition X ⊆ {3, 4, 5} cannot serve as a deviating coalition in the semistrict sense (since
v(X) = 0 holds) shows the semistrict core stability of {12, 345}.
Let us now show that there are no other semistrictly core stable partitions of N . Clearly,
any coalition structure that does not contain a winning coalition cannot be semistrictly core
stable. Let Π be a coalition structure and G ∈ Π be the winning coalition in Π. Inspecting
Table 1, it is immediately seen that G can only be among the best coalitions for either player
1 or player 2, because otherwise the coalition {1, 2} could form and both, 1 and 2, would
strictly benefit from that. It remains to distinguish two cases:
(a) If G = {1, 2, k} ∈ Π for some k ∈ {3, 4, 5}, then for the players in coalition N \ {2}
we have N \ {2} ∼1 {1, 2, k} and N \ {2} Âi Π(i) for each i ∈ N \ {1, 2}. Hence, N \ {2}
blocks Π.
(b) IfG = {1, 3, 4, 5} ∈ Π, then coalition {2, 3, 4}may form, from which all of its members
strictly benefit. Analogously, if G = {2, 3, 4, 5} ∈ Π, then {1, 3, 4} is a blocking coalition.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. In order to show that the strict core is empty, it is sufficient
to check, whether there are semistrictly core stable coalition structures that are also strictly
core stable. In view of Proposition 2, we have to show that there is no partition {O1, . . . , Ok}
of {3, 4, 5}, for which the partition {12, O1, . . . , Ok} is strictly core stable.
Let Π be an arbitrary coalition structure of this kind. Then consider, for example,
coalition X = {1, 3, 4, 5} and notice that X ∼1 Π(1) and X Âi Π(i) for each i ∈ {3, 4, 5},
from which follows that Π is not strictly core stable.
We can conclude from Propositions 1 and 2 that, if one pays attention to coalitional
deviations, then the “most” stable coalition structures are those containing the coalition of
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Union Parties and Social Democrats as the government. Any other government coalition,
e.g., the so-called “Jamaica coalition” containing CDU/CSU, FDP and the Green Party,
are not (semistrictly core) stable, as both fractions in the “big” coalition (CDU/CSU and
SPD) strictly benefit from objecting “Jamaica”. With the same argument, one identifies the
so-called “Ampel coalition” (“traffic light” coalition with SPD, FDP and the Green Party)
not to be semistrictly core stable, either. In the end, from our analysis, there is good reason
that exactly the government that is currently about to form in Germany should form.
Using the weakest stability concept that we introduced here, it turns out that the set of
all core stable coalition structures with two elements is given by
{{12, 345} , {123, 45} , {124, 35} , {125, 34}} .
With an appropriate version of Lemma 1, any core stable partition is either in the above set,
or is obtained from an element above, in which the opposition is split.
Thus, the notion of core stability cannot distinguish between a government containing
only the two big parties from one in which one of the small parties is also there. Clearly, in
such a government, the small party would not obtain any ministry according to the Shapley
value, because it is not needed. To this end, core stability is not strong enough to clearly
answer the government formation question.
4 Final Remarks
The methodology used in this paper to assess government formation can of course be applied
to a broader class of problems. Therefore, we close by relating our results to the study of
coalition formation in simple games starting with the work of Shenoy (1979). Theorem
7.4 there provides a sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core of an abstract game
appropriately induced by a proper monotonic simple game. In order to explain this condition
in our setting, let us take the winning coalitions {1, 3, 5} and {1, 3, 4, 5}, and mention that
Sh1
({1, 3, 4, 5} , v|{1,3,4,5}) = 12 > 13 = Sh1 ({1, 3, 5} , v|{1,3,5}). Thus, the Shapley value does
not respect (in the simple game (N, v)) the fact that if players form a smaller winning
coalition, then their power should not decrease since there are fewer players to share the
same amount of power. In the words of Shenoy (1979), the simple game (N, v) exhibits the
paradox of smaller coalitions (with respect to the Shapley value), and exactly the absence
of this paradox was shown by him to be a sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core.
In contrast, the simple game corresponding to the structure of the 16th German Bundestag
exhibits this paradox and, nevertheless, even its semistrict core is nonempty. Moreover,
as proved in Section 3, all partitions in the semistrict core share an interesting common
property.
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On the other hand, one can see the players in the derived hedonic game as being motivated
only by office-seeking considerations. A possible reason for such an interpretation is the fact
that players’ preferences over coalitions are based on their relative power as measured by the
Shapley value. Given this interpretation, a comparison of our results with the corresponding
results of Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997) is needed. In particular, these authors study
the process of coalition formation when parties are purely office-seeking, construct in an
appropriate way a cooperative game with non-transferable utility, and prove that its strict
core is nonempty and single valued provided that parties care only for their relative weight in
a coalition (the weight being the number of votes for the corresponding party). In contrast,
the semistrict core of the hedonic game we consider is nonempty, while the strict core is
empty. The reason here is that in this paper we focus on the coalition formation process as
being guided by the Shapley value of the corresponding simple games.
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